Monday, October 8, 2018

Sarah E. Cox, American company earned capital gains from two-stage sale of its Australian subsidiary’s assets to Swiss Company, highest court of Australia upholds Commissioner


In dispute with Australian Tax Commissioner over taxable year in which American company earned capital gains from two-stage sale of its Australian subsidiary’s assets to Swiss Company, highest court of Australia upholds Commissioner
Nicholas Kiwi Pty. Ltd. was the former name of an Australian subsidiary of Sara Lee Corporation (SLC) of Maryland, USA. SLC does business in many other countries, the nature of it being the making, selling and distribution of pharmaceutical and health care products. In the early 1990's, Nicholas put its business on the auction market.
Roche Holding Ltd., a Swiss corporation (also with many foreign subsidiaries) was the successful bidder. Roche entered into a “Purchase and Sale Agreement” (PSA) with SLC and 24 named subsidiaries (sellers) including NKA on May 31, 1991. 
A choice-of-law clause made English law applicable to the agreement. Under the PSA, Roche was to take over all of NKA’s health care assets. Under instructions from SLC, a Roche official signed the PSA, without the prior approval of its Board of Directors. The Board eventually ratified this action, however, on August 20, 1991.
Nicholas Products Pty. Ltd. (successor to NKA), a Roche subsidiary whose incorporation date was June 25 1991, obtained the transferred Australian health care assets from Roche. In an August 30, 1991 letter, Roche notified SLC that it had assigned some of its rights and duties under the PSA to several subsidiaries and affiliates, including NKA.
On August 30, 1991, SLC and Roche executed an “Amendment Agreement”(A/A) which, inter alia, increased the price of the assets sold by respondents by $1,000,000. It also cut back on the number of employees NKA was supposed to hire under the PSA from 54 to 14. The A/A expressly amended the PSA and also provided that, all unamended provisions of the PSA, remain “in full force and effect.”
As part of the closing on August 30, 1991, Roche as seller and NKA as buyer executed a “Deed of Assignment” (DOA). It declared that it was pursuant to the PSA and not by way of modification thereof and that, in case of conflict, the PSA was to control. Respondent and NKA also executed a "Deed of Assumption of Liabilities and Contracts" on August 30 described as “pursuant to” the PSA, as amended. It mainly dealt with NKA’s assumption of various obligations and liabilities having to do with intangible rights and assigned contracts. 
The Australian tax authorities differed with SLC as to the date of the asset transfer. If the event took place in the 1992 income year, taxpayer-respondent would have offsetting losses or deductions that would lower the amount of its taxable capital gains. The outcome is otherwise if the controlling date was that of the contract’s execution in May 1991. 
The Tax Commissioner lost before the Full Federal Court of three judges because it failed to persuade them that the taxable event had taken place in the tax year ending June 30,1991 -- the 1991 tax year -- rather than in the 1992 tax year. The Commissioner then obtained review in the High Court of Australia.
The High Court allows the Commissioner’s appeal. It first rules that the Board’s ratification of the previous unauthorized signing of the PSA related back to the date of the PSA, i.e., May 31, 1991. As to the effect of the A/A on the PSA, the High Court holds that the parties intended to vary the rights and liabilities of the PSA in certain important respects but not wholly to rescind and replace it. The Court also concludes that both the PSA and the A/A did not have in mind to transfer assets or liabilities on May 31, but, as was done, by separate deeds delivered at the closing on August 30, 1991.
Addressing the central issue, the High Court then determines the year in which the capital gains on the assets are taxable under PtIIIA of the Income Tax Assessment Act of 1936. Both sides argued on the assumption that the relevant change in asset ownership had taken place on August 30, i.e. in the 1992 tax year.
As to the timing of the asset disposal for tax purposes, the following two provisions apply. Section 160U(3) provides that: “Where the asset was acquired or disposed of under a contract, the time of acquisition or disposal shall be taken to have been the time of the making of the contract.” The following provision, Section 160U(4), then declares that: “Where the asset was acquired or disposed of otherwise than under a contract, the time of acquisition or disposal shall be taken to have been the time when the change in the ownership of the asset that constituted or gave rise to the acquisition or disposal occurred.” [Emphasis supplied.]
Since the disposal of assets had taken place “under a contract,” Section 160U(3) controls. The bottom line for the High Court is as follows. “Where there are two or more contracts which affect the rights and obligations of the parties to a disposal of assets, the identification of the contract under which the assets were disposed of, for the purpose of applying s160U of the Act, requires a judgment as to which of the contracts is properly to be seen as the source of the obligation to effect the disposal. In the present case, that contract is the purchase and sale agreement of 31 May 1991.” [N/A]
The concurring judge agrees with the Tax Commissioner and would also allow the appeal. “In summary therefore, the disposition [of assets] in this case must be taken to have occurred on the making of the May [31, 1991] agreement ... by reason of the language of s160K(5), s160M(1), s160M(1A) and s160M(2), s160U(1) and s160U(2) and particularly s160U(3) of the Act.”
“On that date the respondent executed an agreement and entered into a transaction for the disposal of assets and became entitled (subject to the fulfilment of conditions precedent) to receive consideration which included a component of capital gain. The contract, although subsequently varied (albeit not very significantly in the overall scale of things) was made on 31 May 1991 and the relevant assets were disposed of under it on that date.” [N/A] 
Citation: Commissioner of Taxation v. Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty. Ltd., H.C.A. 35 (High Ct. of Aus. June 15).
 


*** About Sarah Ellen Cox: Sarah E. Cox is a Personal Injury attorney in Fort Myers, Florida. Ms. Cox received her Juris Doctor from Whittier School of Law in 2005, and was admitted to the Florida Bar in 2008. News about Sarah E. Cox are at: https://attorneygazette.com/sarah-ellen-cox# Attorney Profile at: https://solomonlawguild.com/sarah-ellen-cox Blog at: http://SarahECoxBlog.blogspot.com